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Abstract 
We examine the effects of bank’s political connection on bank performance and risk in 
China. We use hand-collected information on CEOs’ professional background to 
identify their political affiliations, and find that banks whose CEOs have former 
government experiences have higher return on assets, lower default risk, and lower 
credit risk. Additionally, politically connected banks have disproportionally higher 
performance when the CEOs previous worked in the same city where the current 
bank’s headquarter locates, had past banking experiences, spend more on entertainment 
and travel costs, and have higher previous administrative rankings (e.g., at the 
provincial or state level). These results suggest that politically connected banks have 
better access to lending to politically connected firms, which are high yield assets and 
more likely to be bailed out when in distress. Our results offer a mechanism of political 
rent seeking, consistent with the institutional environment of China’s banking and 
political system. 
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1. Introduction    
It has been widely acknowledged in the literature that political connections add 
value to firms (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Li et al., 2008; Goldman et al., 
2009). One of the benefits of firm’s political connections is obtaining preferential 
accesses to lending from the government or politically connected banks (Khwaia and 
Mian, 2005). However, these studies have mainly focused on the borrowers’ 
perspectives, and it is unclear whether connections with the government can add value 
to the banks that lend loans to these politically connected firms. It is surprising that 
there exists scarce empirical findings on the impact of political connections on the 
lenders. In this paper, we contribute to the literature by focusing on the impact of 
political connections on bank performance.  
Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that politically powerful firms can obtain rents from 
government banks by threatening bank officers with job transfers and removals, or 
rewarding them with appointments and promotions. In what follows, these politically 
connected firms will benefit from these politically connected loans, while banks will 
suffer. Additionally, governments are also incentivized to prioritize creditors rather 
than bank shareholders to ensure bank safety (Onali et al., 2016). Consequently, instead 
of aiming to maximize shareholder value, the boards of politically connected banks 
may act in the interest of the government due to pressure from the authorities. Such 
agency problems can also arise in the form of policy loans or cronyism for political 
purposes, which would be detrimental to bank performance (Berger, Hasan, and Zhou, 
2009; Gul, 2006). Hence, strong ties with the government may mean less focus on 
shareholder value maximization and lower performance.  
On the other hand, Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) argue that lenders may 
willingly lend to those politically connected firms, who are more likely to be bailed out 
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than their non-connected peers when they encounter economic distress. In addition to 
the lending behavior, it is plausible that politically connected banks may have better 
access to the source of funding, timely liquidity support from either the central bank, 
counter parties or other connected banks, and if possible, face less pressure from 
legislative compliances such as receiving favorable deadline extensions or having 
easier pass on regulatory scrutiny. A politically connected bank can also utilize the 
connections to exchange favors to achieve organizational purposes (Gu et al., 2008), 
and thus improve bank performance. Furthermore, it is important for banks to balance 
the demands from the government to satisfy other non-economic motives without 
sacrificing the economic motive. Compared with a bank without political connection, a 
politically connected bank is more able to detect and interpret relevant political signals, 
to speak the ‘right’ diplomatic language, and in response, to take appropriate actions, 
hence achieving better performance. Based on these arguments, a politically connected 
bank may also benefit from the government ties.   
It is possible that both positive and negative impacts of political connections on bank 
performance are at work, which requires a robust empirical analysis to determine the 
net effect. To answer this question, we examine the relationship between bank CEOs’ 
political connections and bank performance and risk over the period of 2007 to 2014, 
with a focus on the 70 largest commercial banks operating in China. We use the CEO’s 
political connection, defined as having former government working experience, as a 
measure for the bank’s political connection. Due to the unique influence of the CEO in 
a bank, the CEO’s political affiliation provides a suitable proxy for the bank’s ties with 
the government.  
We find that banks whose CEOs have former government experiences (our political 
connection measure) have higher return on assets (ROA), lower default risk (log Z-
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score), and lower credit risk (the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans). The results 
are highly significant, both economically and statistically. For instance, return on assets 
for banks with politically connected CEOs is 0.148% higher, which indicates a 13.21% 
increase relative to the sample average ROA of 1.12%. Similarly, banks whose CEOs 
have former government experiences are associated with a 20.97% increase in log Z-
score (relative to the sample average log Z-score of 1.86) and a 44.23% decrease in 
loan loss provision ratio (relative to the sample average loan loss provision ratio of 
1.16%).  
To identify the causal impact of CEOs’ political connections on bank performance, 
we exploit a quasi-natural experiment of the recent anti-corruption campaign launched 
by China’s current president Xi Jinping since 2013 as an exogenous shock to the 
political connections between bank CEOs and the government. The unprecedented 
campaign has immensely cracked down on the unethical political connection network, 
which used to facilitate corrupt deals between businesses and the government, and led 
to the convictions of hundreds of thousands of corrupt officials (Economist, 2015; Lee, 
2016).4 Hence, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is plausibly exogenous at the level of 
Chinese banks, and allows us to establish the causal effect between CEOs’ former 
government experiences and bank performance. To do so, we estimate a difference-in-
differences (DID) regression, and the DID estimator compares changes in performance 
around the launch of the anti-corruption campaign between banks with and without 
politically connected CEOs. Since the anti-corruption campaign crushed the unethical 
political network, it is plausible that banks that rely more on their CEO’s former 
government connections would suffer more during the post-anti-corruption period. Our 
                                                          
4 Lee (2016) reports that more than 200,000 officials and Party members have been indicted for graft, 
with a 99% rate of conviction since 2013.  
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results confirm this conjecture, and our findings hold when we use the instrumental 
variable (IV) approach as an alternative identification method.  
The finding that political connections improve bank performance is robust to the 
following several factors. First, we analyze whether bank ownership structure may 
affect our findings. We follow Jiang, Liu, and Molyneux (2017) and construct four 
ownership measures. We then reexamine the effect of CEOs’ political connections on 
bank performance and risk after controlling for these ownership variables. We find that 
all of the results hold. Second, we analyze whether the main finding reflects that banks 
with politically connected CEOs can have better access to high-yield assets. To test this 
possibility, we examine the impact of CEOs’ political connections on the ratio of 
interest income to total loans. The result supports this conjecture. Third, we analyze 
how a bank’s performance reacts after replacing its non-politically connected CEO with 
a politically connected one. The results further confirm our previous finding that 
politically connected bank CEOs do improve bank performance.  
We perform several additional tests to explore the heterogeneity in CEO 
characteristics and variations in CEOs’ past government experiences on bank 
performance and risk. First, we expect that the positive association between politically 
connected CEOs and bank performance would be more pronounced when the city the 
bank CEO previously worked is the same as the bank’s headquarter. Second, it is likely 
that politically connected CEOs would benefit from their past banking experiences, 
which strengthen their influence on bank performance. Third, we follow Lin et al. 
(2016) and use a CEO’s entertainment and travel costs (ETC) as a proxy for the CEO’s 
investment in the political connection with bureaucrats. We then examine whether 
politically connected CEOs with higher ETC spending have a more positive impact on 
bank performance and risk. Fourth, we expect the influence of CEOs’ political 
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connections on bank performance and risk to be stronger for CEOs with higher 
previous administrative rankings (e.g., at the provincial or state level). Our findings are 
consistent with these expectations. 
Our results are consistent with the institutional environment of China’s banking and 
political system. It lends support to the argument of Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 
(2006) that lenders willingly lend to politically connected firms who, despite being 
more inefficient and risky, are more likely to receive government bailouts than those 
non-connected counterparts in the event of financial distress, thus resulting in the 
higher profitability and lower credit risk for the lender.5 
 We contribute to several strands of the literature. First, this paper broadly relates to 
the empirical research on the effects of political connections on firm performance. Cao 
et al. (2009) investigate the monetary and political incentives of government appointed 
CEOs and find that both are positively related to firm performance. Lin et al. (2011) 
examine the influence of CEOs’ professional background on firms’ innovation 
activities and show that firms’ innovation efforts are positively associated with CEOs’ 
political connection. Fan et al. (2007) argue that firms with politically connected CEOs 
underperform those led by non-connected CEOs due to the government intervention. 
Our study contributes to this literature by exploring a different mechanism through 
which politically connected banks may be able to use political influence to compete for 
lending opportunities for politically connected firms (mostly state-owned), which 
receive implicit government bailout guarantees.  
Second, the paper adds to the literature on China’s ‘guanxi’ that explores firm 
executives’ personal relationship with the government and its role in explaining firm 
                                                          
5  Khwaja and Mian (2005) argue an adverse effect for government banks by politically powerful 
borrowers that threaten bank officers with job transfers or removals, or lure officers with job 
appointments and promotions. Consequently, the affected lenders would have lower profitability and 
higher credit risk. 
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performance. For example, Xin and Pearce (1996) explore the importance of executives’ 
guanxi with government officials to the business success of private companies, Park 
and Luo (2001) study the integrative framework of guanxi utilization and examine its 
impacts on firm growth and internal operation, and Gu et al. (2008) examine guanxi’s 
direct effects on market competence and performance in China. Our work focuses on 
the banking setting and highlights the value of guanxi in helping Chinese bank CEOs 
with political background to improve bank performance.  
Third, our paper is also related to the corporate governance literature on CEO 
characteristics, which investigates the relation between firm performance and risk-
taking, and various mechanisms of CEO characteristics, such as CEO compensation 
(Brick, Palmon, and Wald, 2006), CEO education (King, Srivastav, and Williams, 
2016), CEO power (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005; Pathan, 2009; Mollah and 
Liljeblom, 2016; Onali et al., 2016), and CEO execution (Kaplan, Klebanov, and 
Sorensen, 2012).  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on the Chinese banking system and the role of bank CEOs in China, as 
well as their guanxi with the government. Section 3 describes the data and construction 
of variables. Section 4 sets out our identification strategies and reports the results. 
Section 5 presents the mechanisms behind our results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Institutional background and bank political connections in China  
The banking system in China, which used to be state-owned and monopolistic, has 
gone through substantial structural changes in the past decades. The sector has changed 
from a mono-banking model to a profit-driven and multi-tiered banking system (Lin 
and Zhang, 2009). Meanwhile, the sector has made huge efforts to transform the 
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corporate governance mechanism into one similar to the western “Anglo-American 
System” (Liang et al., 2013). The transformations include ownership diversification, 
the introduction of a board of directors and a board of supervisors, and more autonomy 
in the senior management’s decision-making process.  
The establishment of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2003 is 
the landmark in the series of reforms. The CBRC enforces various laws to standardize 
operations of bank boards and enhance the efficiency of bank governance. In a process 
of financial liberalization following the banking reform in 2003, many former regional 
credit cooperatives have been restructured and consolidated into city commercial banks. 
Despite new governance mechanisms being put into place during the restructuring 
process, many CEOs of these newly formed banks were directly appointed by the local 
government and had former work experiences at various levels of government 
departments (Martin, 2012). The close political connections between these senior bank 
officers and the government have serious implications for the performance of the banks, 
and may even lead to corrupt deals.  
The 2016 report on China’s financial sector by the Communist Party’s Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) raised serious concerns on corruption 
across China’s financial industry. According to the report, wasting public money on 
extravagant meals and overseas travel, taking bribes for handing out loans, and illegally 
pocketing off-the-book gains were some of the ways corruption had spread in the 
financial industry. The phenomenon of corruption is rooted in the long-standing 
political ties between bank executives and the government, who has the power to 
nominate senior bank executives.  
In this context, one crucial nature of the economic system in China is that personal 
relationships, so-called guanxi in Chinese, play an important role in conducting 
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business.6 In an environment where the government controls key resources, political 
connections may hold the key to the prosperity of banks in China. As political rent-
seeking activities are prevalent in the Chinese society, politically connected senior 
executives of banks often utilize personal ties with government officials to secure 
preferential treatments such as capital injection (Faccio et al., 2006), and easy deposit 
collections (Nys et al., 2015). The role of the bank chief executive officer (CEO), in 
particular, is pivotal during this process.  
In China, a bank CEO is often called a president (Stent, 2016). The bank president 
serves as the executive director of the board and is responsible for the overall direction 
and administration of programs, products, and services provided by the bank, including 
the bank's financial performance, credit quality, business development, operations, 
regulatory compliance, and risk management. Therefore, the president, much like bank 
CEOs in western countries, ensures that all aspects of the bank's activities operate in a 
safe and sound manner, and is indeed the most powerful position in a bank. Given their 
paramount roles, in this paper, we use the CEO’s political connection as a proxy for 
bank political connection and aim to reveal insights into its impact on bank 
performance. 
Political connections can have positive and negative effects on businesses. Most 
studies view the appointment of top executives with former government experiences as 
a special political resource that helps firms gain competitive advantages such as easier 
access to capital market (Francis et al., 2009), favorable tax and bank loans 
                                                          
6 Guanxi plays a crucial role in Chinese businesses. As Hope (2014) notes, “having good ‘guanxi’ – a 
wide network of mutually beneficial relationships developed outside the formal work setting, for instance 
at evening meals or over drinks – is often the secret to securing a business deal.” It is culturally deep-
rooted and extends into every corner of the Chinese society, including government officials. However, as 
pointed out by Lin et al. (2016), guanxi has, to some extent, become a form of corruption in China in 
recent years. Business leaders within the political guanxi network make unethical reciprocal deals with 
the government. Government officials favor these companies by wielding their influence over investment 
approval, regulatory favor, resources allocation, and the like.  
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(Charumilind et al., 2006; Faccio, 2006; Claessens et al., 2008), and government 
bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006), which ultimately increases firm value and performance 
(Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Li et al., 2008; Goldman et al., 2009). 
Specifically, corporate senior executives in China with former government affiliations 
can invest in their established personal relationships or connections with bureaucrats in 
exchange for preferential treatment for their companies (Lin et al., 2016). This 
phenomenon is particularly prominent in the Chinese banking industry, as banks in 
China are not fully open to market competition, and top bank managers may have to 
devote more resources to sustain connections with government officials in order to cope 
with environmental uncertainty (Park and Luo, 2001). Since bank governance still lacks 
effectiveness and relationship-based systems dominate in Chinese society, political 
guanxi remains a vital part for bank CEOs in China.  
 
3. Data, sample selection and variables 
3.1. Data and sample selection 
Our sample is comprised of 70 major domestic banks, including the “big four” state-
owned commercial banks, 12 joint-equity banks, and 54 city commercial banks over the 
period 2007 to 2014.7 These banks are the 70 largest banks based on total assets at the 
end of 2014 and account for 88% of the total assets of the Chinese banking sector.89  
                                                          
7 The “big four” are the four largest state-owned banks, which dominate China’s banking industry and 
are majorly owned by the government. Joint-equity banks are national-level commercial banks with a 
mixture of owners, including the state, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), private enterprises, and foreign 
entities. City commercial banks are municipal level joint-equity banks.   
8 We obtain the total assets of the whole Chinese banking sector from the website of the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC). 
9 There are several takeover transactions happening over our sample period. To mitigate the bias of our 
results, we treat any bank after the acquisition as a new bank. 
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We hand-collect bank CEOs’ prior professional experiences as well as age, gender, 
education background, and tenure from their biographies publicized on official 
websites. Whenever this information is not provided on banks’ websites, we use news 
releases and annual reports of individual banks when available. Lastly, we retrieve bank 
financial information from the Bankscope database. Our final sample consists of 298 
bank-year observations.  
 
3.2. Variables  
We define a CEO as having political connection if he or she is an ex-government 
official. That is, the dummy variable CEO’s political connection is defined as one if the 
CEO served in the government before joining the bank.  
We use three measures of bank performance: return on assets (ROA), logarithm of 
Z-score (e.g., Boyd and Nicolo, 2005), and loan loss provisions ratio (LLP/loans). ROA 
is calculated as net income over total assets. Z-score is computed as the ratio of ROA 
plus the capital-asset ratio to the standard deviation of ROA.10 Z-score is commonly 
used to reflect a bank’s probability of insolvency, with a higher value indicating that 
the bank has lower risks and is more stable. Due to its highly-skewed characteristics, 
we use the natural logarithm of Z-score in our analysis. LLP/loans measures the 
fragility of bank assets, whereby an increase in this ratio indicates an anticipated 
increase in the non-performing loans (NPLs) in a bank’s loan portfolio. This measure is 
particularly applicable to China’s banking sector. Given the large amount of policy 
loans and the internal control weakness, non-performing loans have been a serious 
                                                          
10  We use three-year rolling window for estimating the standard deviation of ROA. Therefore, the 
standard deviation of ROA is time-varying. 
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concern for Chinese banks (Lin and Zhang, 2009; Berger et al., 2009). As such, we use 
LLP/loans as a performance measure to investigate asset qualities across Chinese banks.  
We use two sets of control variables: (1) bank CEOs’ characteristics, including a 
CEO’s age, gender, MBA qualification, education, and tenure, and (2) bank financial 
characteristics, all of which have been shown to have significant influences on bank 
performance (e.g., see Adams and Ferreira, 2009; King et al, 2016; Lin and Zhang, 
2009; Berger et al., 2009; Liang et al., 2013; Mergaerts and Vennet, 2016). One 
important bank characteristic is size (calculated as log total assets). We also include 
size squared in the regression to capture the non-linear relationship between size and 
performance. Other financial characteristic variables include bank Equity to total assets 
(capital ratio), Noninterest income/income, Cost to income (managerial efficiency), and 
Total loans/assets. Previous research shows that better capitalized banks and banks 
with more diversified income sources are associated with higher return on assets and 
greater risk reduction (Chan-Lau et al., 2015; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Additionally, bank cost to income ratio, perceived as 
managerial efficiency, indicates a bank’s running costs and is supposed to be negatively 
correlated with bank performance (Goddard et al., 2010). Following Lin and Zhang 
(2009), we further use loan-to-asset ratio to control for loan portfolio orientation.  
 
3.3. Summary statistics  
We present summary statistics for all the variables in Panel A of Table 1.11 The 
mean value of CEO’s political connection indicates that 37.9% of the observations on 
bank CEOs have former government experiences. Most of the CEOs in the Chinese 
banking sector are male, and in over one quarter of the bank-year observations, the 
                                                          
11 Table A1 in the appendix gives variable definitions. 
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CEOs do not have a bachelor’s degree. Most of the CEOs are also newly appointed, 
with fewer than one quarter of the observations showing that the CEOs have been in 
their current bank for more than four years.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows the characteristics of banks with politically connected 
CEOs and banks with non-connected CEOs. As shown in the table, banks with 
politically connected CEOs have significantly higher return on assets (ROA) and lower 
default risk (higher log Z-score) and credit risk (as proxied by LLP/loans). In terms of 
CEO characteristics, politically connected bank CEOs are more likely to be male, older, 
holders of an MBA degree, have higher education background and longer tenure. We 
also find that banks with politically connected CEOs are larger in asset size, which 
corresponds to the common observation that larger banks in China are more likely to 
have close ties with the government and have senior executives from the government.  
Panel C of Table 1 reports the mean values of CEOs’ characteristics each year in the 
sample. The percentage of politically connected CEOs exhibits swings over the sample 
period. Noticeably, however, starting from 2013, when the anti-corruption campaign 
began, the percentage of CEOs with former government experiences diminishes 
markedly. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table A2 presents the correlations among the explanatory variables we use for the 
analyses and shows that most of the variables have modest correlations with each other. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. The effect of CEOs’ political connections on bank performance 
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We begin our analysis by examining the effect of CEOs’ former government 
experiences (i.e., political connections) on bank performance. Specifically, our baseline 
regression model is as follows:  
,
, , 1
,
 *
* *
   +   
i t
i t i t
i t
Bank Performance CEO's Political Connection
CEO's Controls + Bank Controls
Bank Fixed Effects Year Fixed Effects
 
 


 

 
                (1)  
where i denotes the bank, t denotes the year, the indicator variable CEO’s Political 
Connection equals one if the CEO has former government experiences and zero 
otherwise, and ,i tCEO's Controls , , 1i tBank Controls   are a group of control variables 
representing CEOs’ characteristics and lagged bank financial characteristics that 
include Age, Gender, MBA, Education, Tenure, Log total assets, Log total assets 
square, Equity to total assets, Non-interest income/income, Cost to income, and Total 
loans/assets. We control for bank and year fixed effects to eliminate unobserved time-
invariant and bank-invariant effects. The coefficient of interest is β. Throughout this 
paper, we cluster standard errors at the bank level to account for heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation of error term.  
The results reported in Table 2 indicate that a bank with a CEO who has former 
government experiences has higher profitability, lower probability of insolvency, and 
lower fragility of loans. The coefficient estimates indicate that the economic impact of 
CEOs’ former government experiences on bank performance is economically large. For 
instance, the point estimate for CEO’s Political Connection dummy on ROA implies 
that return on assets for banks with politically connected CEOs is 0.148% higher, 
which indicates a 13.21% increase relative to the sample average ROA of 1.12%. 
Similarly, for the other two performance measures, banks with CEOs having former 
government experiences are associated with a 20.97% increase in log Z-score (relative 
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to the sample average log Z-score of 1.86) and a 44.23% decrease in loan loss provision 
ratio (relative to the sample average loan loss provision ratio of 1.16%).  
We also find that banks with CEOs that have higher education levels are associated 
with better operating performance and lower risk, while banks with longtime CEOs fare 
worse. The significant coefficients on Equity to total assets and Cost to income indicate 
that better capitalized banks, and banks with higher managerial efficiency, are 
associated with higher return on assets and more risk reduction, which is consistent 
with our predictions. Note that the coefficient on log total assets square in column (3) 
is positive and significant, indicating a convex relationship between bank size and loan 
loss provisions. This confirms the previous literature that larger banks tend to have 
better risk management, while whopping banks enjoy “too big to fail” benefits and are 
more risk-taking, thereby incurring more non-performing loans (Laeven et al., 2016; 
Minton et al., 2014). It also reflects the conditions of the largest Chinese banks, who 
are mainly controlled by the government, and suffer more from the problem of NPLs 
due to more policy intervention.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4.2. The effect of CEOs’ political connections on bank performance under the anti-
corruption shock  
One concern on our baseline analysis is that the appointment of politically connected 
CEOs is endogenous to bank performance and risk. The government, if having 
controlling ownership, may directly appoint their preferred CEO to that bank. A well 
performing bank may also have incentives to build up strong relationships with the 
government and hence, is more inclined to hire a former government officer as its CEO. 
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We are also concerned about the confounding factors that may affect CEO appointment 
and bank performance simultaneously. To address these issues, we employ several 
identification strategies.   
We first use the natural experiment of the anti-corruption campaign that has 
exogenously affected the political connections between firm CEOs and the government. 
The advantage of this approach is that this policy event creates a shock to bank CEOs’ 
political connections that is orthogonal to alternative factors that may drive the positive 
relationship between bank political connections and performance.12  We begin with 
some background about the anti-corruption efforts and then compare the performance 
changes of politically connected banks versus non-connected counterparts around the 
campaign launch. 
China’s political corruption has long been a thorny issue since the economic reforms 
in the 1980s. The types of corruption usually involve extravagant bribes in exchange 
for political favor, such as firms trying to secure profitable investments (Svensson, 
2005). The network of political connections, at this point, often plays an active role and 
facilitates corrupt deals between the business and the government (Fan, 2002). As 
corruption was becoming a canker, an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign was 
launched shortly after China’s current president, Xi Jinping, came to power at the end 
of 2012. Several potent measures, including the announcement of the Eight-point 
Regulation and the initiation of sending inspection teams nationwide, were immediately 
taken to intensify the anti-graft efforts.13 Since then hundreds of thousands of officials 
have been convicted of corruption, including some top-level government officials and 
                                                          
12 One may argue that it is the government stake in banks that makes these banks favored. As the 
background detailed in Section 4.2, the quasi-natural experiment from the anti-corruption campaign 
excludes such possibility and many other alternatives that could affect bank performance. 
13  For “Eight-point Regulation”, see http://cpcchina.chinadaily.com.cn/2012-
12/05/content_15991171.htm. For “inspection teams”, see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Leading_Group_for_Inspection_Work. 
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senior executives at state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The banking sector is also not 
exempt from the campaign. For example, the former CEO of China Minsheng Banking 
Corp, Xiaofeng Mao, was investigated for bribery in early 2015. His political 
connection with former top official Ling Jihua was believed to be the main reason for 
the detainment (Flannery, 2015).   
The unexampled campaign against corruption has led to much anxiety among 
businessmen with close ties to government officials (Economist, 2015). Previously, 
corporate senior managers who invested in official connections could grease the wheels 
of the government and enable their firms to “get things done” (Lin et al., 2016). 
However, the anti-corruption campaign has halted this kind of unscrupulous utilization 
of political connections. Fearful of being indicted for corruption, government officials 
and businessmen are reluctant to make reciprocal deals. 
The announcement of the Eight-point Regulation in December 2012 marked the 
beginning of the anti-corruption campaign. We therefore define the post-policy period 
as 2013 and the years afterwards. Since market competition is still weak in the Chinese 
banking industry, banks, relative to other non-banking firms, are more susceptible to 
political influence due to the environmental uncertainty. As such, we conjecture that the 
campaign severely sways the roles of bank CEOs with former government experiences 
and affects the performance of these politically connected banks thereafter.  
We run the following difference-in-differences (DID) regression over the full 
sample period to examine our hypothesis:  
, 1
2
3
, , 1 ,
 *
* -  
-  
* *
i t
i t i t i t
Bank Performance CEO's Political Connection
Anti corruption Campaign
* CEO's Political Connection* Anti corruption Campaign
CEO's Controls + Bank Controls
 


  
 


 
 (2) 
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where the dummy variable Anti-corruption Campaign is defined as one for the time 
period after 2013 (including 2013). The coefficient of interest is β3, which captures the 
extent to which the performance of banks whose CEOs are former government officials 
is more affected than that of banks whose CEOs are not, following the launch of the 
anti-corruption campaign. We thus expect β3 to be negative and significant if the 
dependent variables are ROA and log Z-score, and to be positive and significant if the 
dependent variable is LLP/loans. 
Table 3 reports the results. In columns (1) through (3), we test the effect of CEOs’ 
former government experiences on bank performance under the anti-corruption shock 
without using fixed effects, while in columns (4) through (6) we repeat the regression 
after including bank and year fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
across banks and years. The dummy variable Anti-corruption Campaign is dropped 
from the regression because of the inclusion of year fixed effects. As shown in the table, 
the coefficient on the interaction term β3 is negative and significant when the dependent 
variables are ROA and log Z-score, and is positive and significant when using 
LLP/loans as another measure of bank performance. These findings indicate that the 
anti-corruption shock is associated with lower levels of bank performance for 
politically connected bank CEOs relative to their non-connected counterparts, which 
supports our argument. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Overall, by exploiting the anti-corruption shock in China as a natural experiment, we 
use the DID estimation to confirm the causal relationship of Chinese bank CEOs’ 
former government experiences on bank performance. Since the anti-corruption 
campaign crushed the unethical political network, banks with politically connected 
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CEOs experience significant performance deterioration during the post-anti-corruption 
period.  
 
4.3. Placebo tests 
A possible concern with our results in Table 3 is that we use a single event, namely, 
the anti-corruption campaign, as an exogenous shock to identify the impact of CEOs’ 
former government experiences on bank performance. If there are differential trends 
across banks in performance before the anti-corruption campaign, we may incorrectly 
attribute these trends to the anti-corruption shock. To investigate whether our results 
are driven by differential trends prior to the anti-corruption shock, we conduct placebo 
(falsification) tests. We replicate specification (2), but shift the start of the post-policy 
period to 2012 (one year ahead).  
Table 4 shows that there is no evidence of pre-existing differential trends in 
performance between banks with politically connected CEOs and those with non-
connected CEOs for the placebo shock year, as shown by the insignificant coefficients 
on the interaction term. Therefore, by examining the period that is not accompanied by 
the anti-corruption shock, we alleviate the concern that unobserved variations other 
than the anti-corruption campaign trigger sharp contrasts in the post-policy period 
between banks whose CEOs have former government experiences and those whose 
CEOs do not.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.4. Instrumental variable regressions 
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We next use an alternative instrumental variable (IV) approach to further enrich our 
identification for the causal effect of CEOs’ political connections on bank performance. 
Specifically, we need an instrumental variable that is correlated with CEO’s Political 
Connection, but does not directly affect the dependent variable Bank Performance in 
equation (1). Thus, we construct such an instrument in the following way. For each 
bank in each year, we focus on the proportion of CEOs with former government 
experiences among all other banks (i.e., excluding the bank itself) in the size decile to 
which the bank itself belongs in that year. We refer to this variable as proportion of 
politically connected CEOs in comparable banks. We use it as an instrument for the 
bank’s CEO’s Political Connection.  
Note that we depend on commonalities in size while defining our instrumental 
variable. The motivation for this comes from the wisdom that banks of a similar size 
share common behaviors (Sapienza, 2004). Thus, the characteristics of a bank CEO are 
correlated with those of CEOs in peer banks that are comparable in size. The 
instrument also meets the exclusion restriction because CEOs in other banks cannot 
plausibly have direct influence on the examined bank.  
Table 5 reports the IV results using two-stage least squares (2SLS). For brevity, we 
do not report the coefficients on the control variables.14 We find strong explanatory 
power from the instrument for the endogenous variable CEO’s Political Connection 
with the highly significant coefficient on the instrument in the first-stage regressions. 
Moreover, the F-statistic in the first regression is above 30, which suggests that the 
instrument is powerful and unlikely to be biased towards the OLS estimates based on 
the cut-off threshold of Staiger and Stock (1997).15  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
                                                          
14 The omitted coefficients on the control variables are available upon request.  
15 If there is one endogenous variable, the minimum value of the first-stage F-statistic, which Staiger and 
Stock (1997) suggest should be greater than 10. 
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The results of the IV regressions are qualitatively similar to our baseline results. The 
findings confirm the argument that politically connected CEOs can lift profitability and 
lower default and credit risk in Chinese banks. As described in Section 4.1, the OLS 
results in Table 2 may suffer from the inherent selection bias associated with the 
decision to appoint a CEO. The IV approach as well as the above DID regression 
address this concern and provide further robustness evidence.    
 
4.5. Robustness checks 
We perform several robustness checks for our main findings. To streamline the 
presentation, we report only the key variables of interests. Table 6 reports the results of 
these tests. 
First, we analyze whether various ownership types of banks may affect our findings. 
This is because some studies show that the impact of political connections may depend 
on a firm’s ownership structure (e.g., Wu, Wu, and Rui, 2012). To this end, we adopt 
the hand-collected ownership data of Chinese banks from Jiang, Liu, and Molyneux 
(2017), and follow their method to define the measures reflecting ownership types. 
Specifically, we classify banks into four mutually exclusive groups based on ownership 
types: State owned, Private, Foreign, and Widely-held.16 Importantly, our ownership 
measures allow for changes in a bank’s ownership type since a bank’s top ten owners 
and their stakes may vary over time. We then incorporate these ownership variables 
into our baseline model (1), in which the variable item Bank Control contains the set of 
control variables defined earlier. Columns (1) to (3) in Table 6 report the results, and 
show that the inclusion of bank ownership types does not change the pattern of results 
                                                          
16 Detailed definitions of ownership variables are given in Table A1 in the appendix. 
22 
 
reported in Table 2. We also find that state owned banks are associated with higher 
ROA and lower Log Z-score, indicating higher bank performance and higher risk. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Second, we consider whether the positive association between political connections 
and bank performance is because banks with politically connected CEOs can do 
“cream-skimming”, i.e., they have better access to high-yield assets and get more 
(implicit) public guarantees. This consideration reflects our hypothesis that banks with 
better political connections are more able to secure lending to politically connected 
firms. In general, these lending deals are high-yield loans and are more likely to be 
repaid by the government in the event of a default. To test this possibility, we examine 
the impact of CEOs’ political connections on the ratio of interest income to total loans. 
If politically connected banks stand a better position to lend to politically connected 
borrowers, we would expect a positive relationship between CEOs’ political 
connections and this ratio. Column (4) in Table 6 reports the results. The positive and 
significant coefficient on CEO's political connection shows that politically connected 
banks have higher interest income ratios over total loans compared with non-connected 
counterparts. The finding supports our conjecture that these banks have better access to 
high-yield assets.  
Third, we consider how a bank’s performance reacts after replacing its non-
politically connected CEO with a politically connected one. We define a dummy 
variable CEO replacement as one after the bank experienced a CEO turnover where its 
non-politically connected CEO was replaced by a politically connected one. We then 
examine the effect of CEO replacement on different performance measures. 17  The 
coefficient on CEO replacement dummy essentially captures the differential effects of 
                                                          
17 We only select those banks without any politically connected CEOs within our sample period as the 
control group. 
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non-politically connected CEO turnover on bank performance and risk. In order to 
avoid the adverse impact of the anti-corruption campaign starting from 2013 on 
politically connected CEOs, we restrict the sample period to between 2007 and 2012. 
The results are reported in columns (5) to (7) in Table 6. The significant coefficients on 
CEO replacement indicate that banks, after replacing their CEOs without political 
connections by those with such connections, have an increase in return on assets (ROA) 
and log Z-score, and a decrease in loan loss provision ratio, relative to those banks 
without such a replacement. These results further confirm our previous findings that 
politically connected bank CEOs do improve bank performance. 
 
5. Bank CEOs’ characteristics and political connections 
The results thus far suggest that CEOs’ political connections have a positive effect 
on bank performance. To better understand the mechanisms behind our results, we 
further explore the heterogeneity in CEO characteristics and examine variations in the 
CEOs’ former government experiences on bank performance. 
First, if a CEO, before joining their current bank, worked in a city the same as where 
the bank’s headquarter locates, he or she may have already established a dense network 
of interpersonal obligations in that city. This geographical advantage should enable the 
CEO to divert personal connection more efficiently into the current bank following the 
appointment. Therefore, we expect that the political impact will be much stronger for 
CEOs from the same city of the headquarters of the current bank.  
To examine the local political connection effect, we define the dummy variable 
Local Experience as one if the CEO worked in the same city immediately before being 
appointed by their current bank. Note that our definition does not require that Local 
Experience is one only if the CEO is from local government. For example, Local 
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Experience is also equal to one if the CEO worked for a technology company right 
before joining the current bank within the same city. We include this dummy variable 
into our regression and estimate the following specification:   
, 1
2
3
, , 1
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* *
*
* *
  
i t
i t i t
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(3)                                
where we replace the general term CEO Characteristics by the variable Local 
Experience. The results are reported in columns (1) through (3) in Table 7. We find that 
the coefficient on the interaction term CEO’s Political Connection * Local Experience 
is positive and significant for both dependent variables ROA and log Z-score, and is 
negatively significant for the dependent variable LLP/loans. These findings show that 
the positive impact of political connections on bank performance is intensified for 
CEOs who worked in the local city, a result that is consistent with our prediction. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Second, previous literature shows that a CEO who has previously worked in the 
relevant industry can exploit their experience to introduce strategic changes, improve 
governance efficiency, and thus maximize firm performance (Greiner and Bhambri, 
1989; Acharya et al., 2011). Thus, we expect that prior banking experiences can help 
politically connected CEOs further strengthen their positive impact.  
To evaluate this conjecture, we re-estimate the regression model in equation (3) by 
using another CEO characteristic Banking Experience, which is an indicator variable 
defined as one if the CEO has previously worked for banks. The results are presented in 
columns (4) through (6) in Table 7. As indicated by the significant coefficients on the 
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interaction term, the positive impact of political connections on bank performance is 
stronger for CEOs who also used to work for banks. Our findings are consistent with 
the development in the banking industry that privatization and enhanced market 
competition resulting from the recent banking reforms in China have deepened the need 
for managerial expertise. As such, the banking experiences of senior management 
become increasingly important for these more market-oriented banks. 
Third, different bank CEOs may invest differently in their connections with the 
government to sustain political influence. Lin et al. (2016) use firm executives’ 
entertainment and travel costs (ETCs) as a proxy for firms’ investment in political 
connections. They argue that higher ETCs are associated with stronger political 
connections, which can be utilized by firms to “get things done”. We therefore expect 
that the positive association between CEOs’ political connections and bank 
performance is more pronounced for CEOs with high ETC spending.  
In this vein, we use bank CEOs’ ETCs from the WIND database and define the 
dummy variable High ETC Bank as one if the CEO’s ETC is in the top quartile among 
all listed banks at the end of 2012. As the ETC data are only available for listed 
companies, we use the subsample of listed banks to re-estimate model (3) and replace 
Banking Experience with High ETC Bank.  
As shown in columns (7) through (9) in Table 7, the significant coefficients on the 
interaction term suggest that the high spending on ETC is associated with a more 
positive impact on bank performance for CEOs with former government experiences. 
The result is in line with our expectation that, with more resources devoted to 
sustaining connections with the government, politically connected banks may be better 
able to overcome institutional barriers and instability in the face of market uncertainty. 
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Fourth, politically connected CEOs may have different previous administrative 
hierarchies. Francis, Hasan, and Sun (2009) argue that firms with high-ranking ex-
government officials on their boards could be characterized by stronger political 
connections. We thus expect the impact of CEOs’ political connections on bank 
performance to be stronger for CEOs with higher previous administrative rankings (e.g., 
at the provincial or state level). Specifically, we use the dummy variable High 
Administrative Ranking to distinguish between CEOs who are from government 
departments above the city level and those from the government at or below the city 
level. We then examine the effect of High Administrative Ranking on bank 
performance. Our results are shown in columns (10) through (12) in Table 7. The 
finding confirms our prediction. 
 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we examine the relation between banks’ political connections and the 
performance and risk using a sample of the top 70 banks from 2007 to 2014. We use 
hand-collected information on CEOs’ professional background to identify their political 
affiliations. We then analyze their effects on bank performance in China after 
controlling for other CEO and bank characteristics, and we find that banks led by 
politically connected CEOs outperform their non-connected counterparts.  
We employ several identification strategies to pin down the causal effect of CEOs’ 
political connections to address inherent selection biases associated with the decision to 
appoint a CEO. We first use Xi’s anti-corruption campaign as an exogenous shock to 
the political connections between CEOs and the government. By using a difference-in-
differences framework, we find that banks whose CEOs have former government 
experience undergo significant performance deterioration during the post-anti-
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corruption period. We also use another IV approach to confirm the causal interpretation 
of the positive effect of CEOs’ political connections on bank performance. Our findings 
are not driven by the confounding factors that affect bank performance and CEO 
appointment simultaneously. 
We also document that CEOs’ political connections affect bank performance 
through a series of mechanisms that are related to the heterogeneity in CEOs’ 
characteristics and former government experiences. These results suggest that 
politically connected banks have better access to lending to politically connected firms, 
which are high yield assets and more likely to be bailed out when in distress. Our 
results offer a mechanism of political rent seeking consistent with the institutional 
environment of China’s banking and political system. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 
 
Definition of Variables 
Variable Name Definition 
Bank Performance  
ROA% The ratio of net income to total assets 
Log Z-score The natural logarithm of Z-score. Z-score is an 
accounting-based bank-level indicator of financial 
stability. It is measured by the sum of ROA and 
equity ratio over the standard deviation of ROA. 
Standard deviation of ROA is calculated on a three-
year rolling window basis. A high Z-score indicates a 
high level of stability 
LLP/total loans% The ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 
CEOs' Characteristics  
CEO’s political connection A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO served in 
the government before joining the current bank 
Age The age of the CEO 
Gender A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is male 
MBA A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO holds an 
MBA  
Education A discrete variable that ranges from zero to three. 
This variable is equal to one if the CEO has acquired 
a Bachelor’s qualification, equal to two if the CEO 
has acquired a Master’s qualification; equal to three if 
the CEO has acquired a doctoral qualification; and 0 
otherwise 
Tenure A discrete variable that records the number of years 
that the CEO has worked in the current bank 
CEO replacement A dummy variable equal to one after a bank replaced 
its non-politically connected CEO with a connected 
one, and zero otherwise 
Local Experience A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO's previous 
work experience was in the same city 
Banking Experience A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has 
worked in the banking industry 
High ETC Banks A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO’s personal 
entertainment and travel costs are in the top quarter 
among all listed banks 
High Administrative Ranking A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO's previous 
administrative hierarchy is above the city level 
Bank Financial Characteristics  
Total assets The total assets of each bank 
Log total assets The natural logarithm of total assets 
Equity to total assets% The ratio of total equity to total assets 
Noninterest income/income% The ratio of noninterest income to total operating 
income 
Cost to income% The ratio of total cost to total income 
Total Loans/assets% The ratio of total loans to total assets 
Interest income/total loans% The ratio of interest income to total loans 
(Continued) 
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Table A1 
Continued 
 
Variable Name Definition 
Bank Ownership Variables  
State owned A dummy variable equal to one if a bank satisfies 
both of the following criteria: (1) the sum of the stock 
of the top ten largest stockholders (CR10) is greater 
than 50%; and (2) state owners collectively are the 
largest stockholder group with at least 25% of total 
outstanding shares 
Private A dummy variable equal to one if a bank satisfies 
both of the following criteria: (1) CR10 is greater than 
50%; and (2) private owners collectively are the 
largest stockholder group with at least 25% of total 
outstanding shares 
Foreign A dummy variable equal to one if a bank satisfies 
both of the following criteria: (1) CR10 is greater than 
50%; and (2) foreign owners collectively are the 
largest stockholder group with at least 25% of total 
outstanding shares 
Widely-held A dummy variable equal to one if a bank belongs to 
none of the above groups 
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Table A2 
Correlation Matrix 
 
          This table reports the correlation matrix. * denotes the 5% significance level. All variables are defined in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. 
   
  
CEO’s 
political 
connection Age Gender MBA Education Tenure 
Log total 
assets 
Equity to total 
asset% 
Noninterest 
income/income% 
Cost to 
income% Total loans/assets% 
CEO's political 
connection 1 
          Age 0.1096* 1 
         Gender 0.2691* -0.1922* 1 
        MBA 0.1290* 0.0472* 0.0522* 1 
       Education 0.3886* -0.3369* 0.3497* -0.1055 1 
      Tenure 0.1408* 0.0756* -0.0217 -0.0515*  -0.0322 1 
     Log total assets 0.2329* 0.1076* 0.2352* -0.0855*   0.4625* -0.0917* 1 
    Equity to total assets% 0.0262 0.0038 -0.1846* 0.0795*  -0.1462* -0.1196* -0.3035* 1 
   Noninterest 
income/income% 0.0487* 0.0233 -0.0650* -0.1034*   0.0973* -0.0378 0.0408* 0.2581*   1 
  Cost to income% -0.0466* -0.1056* 0.1093* 0.0596*   0.0548* 0.1219* -0.0394* -0.1316*   0.1208* 1 
 Total loans/assets% 0.0891* -0.0082 -0.1239* 0.1035*  -0.0628* 0.2200* -0.1376* 0.0054   -0.1169* -0.0710* 1 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Panel A reports the summary statistics for the sample of Chinese banks in the period of 2007-2014. Panel B compares banks that have politically 
connected CEOs with banks that have non-connected CEOs. *, **, and *** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Panel 
C reports a year-wise distribution of the mean values of CEOs’ characteristics. All variables are defined in Table A1 in the Appendix.    
Panel A   
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min p25 Median p75 Max 
Bank Performance 
       
ROA% 298 1.123 0.440 -0.970 0.900 1.130 1.400 2.580 
Log Z-score 298 1.855 1.040 -1.470 1.223 1.865 2.600 4.497 
LLP/loans% 298 1.162 2.728 0.000 0.300 0.750 1.160 38.220 
CEOs’ Characteristics 
       CEO's political 
connection 298 0.379 0.486 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Age 298 51.852 4.595 37.000 49.000 53.000 55.000 64.000 
Gender 298 0.789 0.409 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MBA 298 0.010 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Education 298 0.762 0.730 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 
Tenure 298 2.909 1.783 1.000 1.000 2.000 4.000 7.000 
Bank Financial Characteristics 
      Total assets (CNY 
billion) 298 855.894 10422.050 0.010 0.061 0.123 0.325 20151.032 
Log total assets 298 12.120 1.736 9.762 11.020 11.719 12.692 19.431 
Equity to total assets% 298 6.770 2.034 2.200 5.440 6.510 7.870 14.180 
Noninterest 
income/income% 298 8.041 6.529 -1.692 3.383 6.026 10.966 29.518 
Cost to income% 298 60.459 10.903 0.000 56.061 61.611 66.856 77.561 
Total Loans/assets% 298 47.223 10.328 21.691 40.588 48.769 55.638 64.277 
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Panel B: Comparison of banks with politically connected CEOs and banks without 
 
CEO’s political connection = 1 CEO’s political connection = 0 Difference 
  N Mean N Mean   
Bank Performance 
    
ROA% 111 1.192 187 1.018 0.174*** 
Log Z-score 111 1.982 187 1.636 0.122*** 
LLP/loans% 111 0.972 187 1.322 -0.336** 
CEOs’ Characteristics 
    
Age 111 52.496 187 51.497 0.998* 
Gender 111 0.929 187 0.706 0.223*** 
MBA 111 0.027 187 0.000 0.026** 
Education 111 1.124 187 0.535 0.589*** 
Tenure 111 3.239 187 2.690 0.549*** 
Bank Financial Characteristics 
   
Total assets 111 1270.211 187 1.073 1270.234* 
Log total assets 111 12.636 187 11.804 0.832*** 
Equity to total assets% 111 6.838 187 6.739 0.099 
Noninterest income/income% 111 8.447 187 7.739 0.708 
Cost to income% 111 59.809 187 60.801 -0.992 
Total Loans/assets% 111 48.399 187 46.316 2.083 
Panel C 
 
Mean value of CEOs' characteristics   
Year 
Number of 
CEOs  
CEO's political 
connection Age Gender MBA Education Tenure 
2007 9 0.286 51.714 0.857 0.000 0.571 2.714 
2008 18 0.333 52.333 0.750 0.000 0.667 2.250 
2009 21 0.429 52.143 0.714 0.000 0.714 2.238 
2010 38 0.342 51.711 0.763 0.000 0.658 2.184 
2011 47 0.362 51.319 0.787 0.000 0.745 2.702 
2012 55 0.400 51.691 0.818 0.018 0.818 3.018 
2013 58 0.362 52.155 0.793 0.017 0.810 3.345 
2014 52 0.349 52.651 0.721 0.023 0.721 3.674 
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Table 2 
The effect of CEOs’ political connections: Baseline results 
This table reports the OLS results of the impact of bank CEOs' political connections on bank performance and risk for Chinese 
banks in the sample period of 2007-2014. All variables are defined in Table A1 in the Appendix. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable ROA% Log Z-score LLP/loans% 
  (1) (2) (3) 
CEO's political connection 0.148** 0.389* -0.514**  
 
(2.15) (1.97) (-2.11)    
Age 0.013 0.027 -0.079**  
 
(1.08) (0.63) (-2.66)    
Gender 0.251** 1.449*** -0.023    
 
(2.10) (3.46) (-0.06)    
MBA -0.241** 0.179 1.220*** 
 
(-2.54) (0.42) (6.46)    
Education 0.201*** 0.470*** -0.049    
 
(8.22) (4.32) (-0.53)    
Tenure -0.014** -0.077*** 0.024    
 
(-2.44) (-2.75) (0.54)    
Log total assets 0.199* 0.863 1.188    
 
(1.88) (1.61) (1.19)    
Log total asset square 0.023 0.005 0.015**    
 
(1.60) (0.27) (2.35)    
Equity to total assets% 0.010*** 0.199*** -0.104*** 
 
(2.60) (2.77) (-3.28)    
Noninterest income/income% 0.000 0.000** -0.005    
 
(0.22) (2.62) (-0.56)    
Cost to income% -0.027*** -0.088*** 0.028**  
 
(-5.43) (-5.29) (2.60)    
Total loans/assets% -0.010* -0.037* 0.036    
 
(-1.73) (-1.71) (1.58)    
Constant -0.407 2.908 -5.956 
 
(-0.27) (0.37) (-0.98) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 298 298 298 
adj. R-sq 0.3969 0.3597 0.2080 
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Table 3 
The effect of CEOs’ political connections: The Anti-Corruption Campaign as a natural 
experiment of political connection 
This table reports the difference-in-differences (DID) regression results of banks’ performance and risk on bank CEOs' political 
connections for Chinese banks in the sample period of 2007-2014.  Anti-corruption Campaign is a dummy variable, which equals one if 
the year is later than 2012. All other variables are defined in Table A1 in the Appendix. Columns (1) to (3) show the results of the effect 
of bank CEOs' political connections on bank performance around the anti-corruption campaign using the standard DID regression. 
Columns (4) to (6) show the DID results after controlling for bank and year fixed effects. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable ROA% Log Z-score LLP/loans% ROA% Log Z-score LLP/loans% 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    
CEO's political connection 0.146 0.644** -0.303*   0.086*** 0.088** -0.553** 
 
(1.33) (2.59)  (-1.94)   (2.92) (2.49) (-2.27) 
CEO's political connection* 
Anti-Corruption Campaign -0.256** -0.669*** 0.561*** -0.229** -0.645* 0.409**  
 
(-2.28) (-2.71) (3.27)    (-2.02) (-1.88) (2.00)    
Anti-Corruption Campaign 0.133* 0.268 -0.161    
   
 
(1.76) (1.35) (-0.80)    
   
Age 0.013* -0.015 -0.020    -0.010 0.065 -0.075*** 
 
(1.83) (-0.92) (-1.40)    (-0.15) (0.25) (-2.68)    
Gender -0.101 -0.341*** -0.480*** 0.007 -0.015 -0.047    
 
(-1.61) (-2.93) (-2.97)    (1.15) (-0.92) (-0.13)    
MBA -0.847** -0.884*** 2.010*** -0.148** -0.320*** 0.893*** 
 
(-2.46) (-4.23) (6.99)    (-2.34) (-2.66) (2.83)    
Education 0.145*** 0.144** 0.158    0.763** 2.027*** -0.110    
 
(2.84) (2.61) (1.07)    (2.23) (4.48) (-1.32)    
Tenure -0.035** -0.086*** 0.038    -0.134** -0.141** 0.009    
 
(-2.03) (-2.94) (1.00)    (-2.25) (-2.39) (0.20)    
Log total assets -0.309 0.444 0.052    -0.038** -0.088*** 1.462    
 
(-1.62) (1.36) (0.16)    (-2.17) (-3.07) (1.39)    
Log total asset square 0.009 -0.012 -0.003    -0.202 0.384 -0.027    
 
(1.34) (-1.10) (-0.32)    (-1.12) (1.25) (-0.60)    
Equity to total assets% -0.002 0.037 -0.047    0.006* -0.010 -0.110*** 
 
(-0.09) (0.96) (-1.25)    (1.86) (-0.97) (-3.36)    
Noninterest income/income% 0.003 0.001 0.000    -0.000 0.032 -0.004    
 
(0.77) (0.05) (0.03)    (-0.02) (0.85) (-0.43)    
Cost to income% -0.003 -0.034*** 0.020*** 0.003 0.000 0.030*** 
 
(-0.64) (-4.44) (3.28)    (0.81) (0.02) (2.80)    
Total loans/assets% -0.001 -0.009 0.016*** -0.005 -0.033*** 0.033    
 
(-0.46) (-1.53) (2.60)    (-0.85) (-4.35) (1.47)    
Constant -0.010 12.386** 4.017*   -0.002 -0.009 -4.005    
 
(-0.01) (2.20) (1.77)    (-0.90) (-1.47) (-0.18)    
Bank Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 298 298 298    298 298 298 
adj. R-sq 0.5178 0.3856 0.2011 0.5101 0.1658 0.4112 
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Table 4 
The effect of CEOs’ political connections: Placebo test for Anti-Corruption Campaign  
This table reports the difference-in-differences regression results of banks’ performance and risk on bank CEOs' political connections for Chinese 
banks in the sample period of 2007-2014. Columns (1) to (3) show the results of the effect of bank CEOs' political connections on bank 
performance around one year before the anti-corruption campaign. Columns (4) to (6) show the results after controlling for bank and year fixed 
effects. All variables are defined in Table A1 in the Appendix. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable ROA% 
Log Z-
score LLP/loans% ROA% 
Log Z-
score 
LLP/loans
% 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
CEO's political connection 0.194*** 0.564*** -0.511**  0.235** 0.582*** -0.471**    
 
(2.66) (2.96) (-2.11)    (2.51) (2.64) (-2.18)    
CEO’s political connection* 
Falsified one year before Anti-Corruption Reforms 0.086 0.296 0.444    0.017 -0.188 0.008    
 
(0.86) (1.13) (1.50)    (0.26) (-0.83) (0.05)    
Falsified one year before Anti-Corruption Reforms -0.164* -0.321 -0.247 
   
 
(-1.66) (-1.27) (-1.37) 
   
Age 0.013** 0.003 -0.022 0.013* 0.001 -0.079**  
 
(2.07) (0.19) (-1.53) (1.91) (0.06) (-2.62)    
Gender -0.081 -0.428*** -0.503*** -0.085 -0.439*** -0.020    
 
(-1.31) (-4.15) (-3.19) (-1.34) (-4.09) (-0.06)    
MBA -0.887** -2.262*** 1.644*** -0.891** -2.319*** 1.214*** 
 
(-2.43) (-3.79) (5.20) (-2.44) (-3.88) (5.95)    
Education 0.006 0.025 0.121 0.005 0.018 -0.048    
 
(0.11) (0.20) (0.87) (0.09) (0.15) (-0.53)    
Tenure -0.009 -0.145*** 0.004 -0.006 -0.138*** 0.025    
 
(-0.57) (-4.57) (0.12) (-0.45) (-4.43) (0.54)    
Log total assets -0.338* 0.534 0.055 -0.326* 0.571 1.199    
 
(-1.67) (1.40) (0.17) (-1.69) (1.64) (1.21)    
Log total asset square 0.010 -0.018 -0.005 0.010 -0.019 -0.016    
 
(1.38) (-1.34) (-0.46) (1.41) (-1.56) (-0.37)    
Equity to total assets% -0.010 0.021 -0.060* -0.010 0.022 -0.104*** 
 
(-0.49) (0.49) (-1.72) (-0.48) (0.54) (-3.30)    
Noninterest income/income% 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.005 -0.005    
 
(0.97) (0.86) (0.03) (0.57) (0.45) (-0.55)    
Cost to income% -0.004 0.006 0.020*** -0.003 0.011 0.028**  
 
(-0.73) (0.75) (3.11) (-0.49) (1.51) (2.57)    
Total loans/assets% -0.000 -0.001 0.019*** 0.000 0.001 0.036    
 
(-0.07) (-0.14) (3.43) (0.15) (0.08) (1.59)    
Constant 3.322*** -2.218 4.476* 3.078** -2.850 -6.452 
 
(2.66) (-0.86) (1.91) (2.54) (-1.17) (-1.09) 
Bank Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 298 298 298    298 298 298 
adj. R-sq 0.1594 0.1861 0.207 0.2427 0.2178 0.4314 
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Table 5 
The effect of CEOs’ political connections: Evidence from the instrumental variable 
This table reports the 2SLS results of banks’ performance and risk on bank CEOs' political connections for Chinese banks in the sample 
period of 2007-2014. Column (1) shows the first stage results of instrumental variables. Columns (2) to (4) show the second stage 
regression results for the impact of bank CEOs' political connections on bank performance and risk. All variables are defined in Table 
A1 in the Appendix. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
 
CEO's political 
connection ROA% 
Log Z-
score 
LLP/loans
% 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) 
Proportion of politically connected CEOs in comparable banks 0.985*** 
   
 
(15.88) 
   
CEO's political connection 0.151** 0.115** -0.008***    
  
(2.25) (2.60) (-3.62)    
Constant -0.826*** 2.878* 2.487 -14.207  
 
(-8.31) (1.75) (1.06) (-1.39)    
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics  35.571 
   
N 298 298 298 298 
adj. R-sq 0.3136 0.5136 0.5195 0.4613    
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Table 6 
Robustness checks 
This table reports robustness tests for links between CEOs’ political connections and bank performance and risk for Chinese banks by using three different 
strategies. Columns (1) to (3) show the results after controlling for government ownership. Column (4) examines whether banks with politically connected 
CEOs have better access to high-yield assets. Columns (5) to (7) investigate how bank performance changes when its non-politically connected CEO is 
replaced by a politically connected CEO. CEO replacement is a dummy variable, which equals one for the time period after the bank changed a non-politically 
connected CEO to a politically connected one. Please note, we only select those banks without any politically connected CEO within our sample period as the 
control group. All other variables are defined in Table A1 in the Appendix. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable ROA% Log Z-score LLP/loans% 
Interest 
income/ 
total loans% ROA% Log Z-score LLP/loans% 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CEO's political connection 0.213*** 0.354*** -0.538*** 0.142**    
 
(4.87) (4.32) (-3.44) (2.41)    
CEO replacement     0.191*** 0.467*** -0.781*** 
     (3.94) (5.22) (-4.69)    
State owned 0.318*** -0.423* 0.289        
 
(3.89) (-1.90) (1.37)        
Private -0.157 -0.129 0.681     
 
(-1.39) (-1.63) (1.23)     
Foreign -0.035 0.180 0.562     
 
(-0.93) (1.42) (1.65)     
Widely-held 0.246 0.224 1.384     
 
(1.33) (0.43) (0.95)     
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 298 298 298 298 134 134 134 
adj. R-sq 0.4524 0.5832 0.4419 0.6235 0.4568 0.4478 0.5437 
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Table 7 
Bank CEOs’ characteristics and political connections     
This table reports the OLS results of banks’ performance on bank CEOs' political connections with different CEOs’ characteristics for Chinese banks in the sample period of 2007-2014. Local Experience is a dummy variable, which equals one if the CEO's previous work experience 
was in the same city. Banking Experience is a dummy variable, which equals one if the CEO has worked in the banking industry. High ETC Banks is a dummy variable, which equals one if the CEO’s personal entertainment and travel costs are in the top quarter among all listed 
banks. High Administrative Ranking is a dummy variable, which equals one if the CEO's previous administrative hierarchy is above the city level. Columns (1) to (3) report the results for whether local CEOs have superior performance. Columns (4) to (6) report the results for 
whether experienced CEOs have superior performance. Columns (7) to (9) report the results for whether high ETC banks have superior performance. Columns (10) to (12) report the results for whether CEOs with previous higher administrative hierarchies in the government have 
superior performance. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable ROA% Log Z-score LLP/loans% ROA% Log Z-score LLP/loans% ROA% Log Z-score LLP/loans% ROA% Log Z-score LLP/loans% 
  Local experience Banking experience High ETC banks High administrative ranking 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9)    (10) (11) (12) 
CEO's political connection 0.150*** 0.391** -0.673**  0.532* 0.529** -0.514** 0.228*** 0.543 -0.493*    
 
(2.90) (2.16) (-2.65)    (1.72) (2.60) (-2.11)    (3.05) (1.17) (-1.74)    
CEO's political connection 
*Local Experience 0.244*** 0.169*** -0.481**  
      
   
 
(3.32) (2.90) (-2.46)  
      
   
CEO's political connection 
*banking experience    0.158*** 0.119** -0.410** 
   
   
    
(4.01) (2.33) (-2.67) 
   
   
CEO's political 
connection*High ETC banks     
  
0.006*** 0.299*** -0.014**     
       
(3.00) (2.68) (-2.49)      
High Administrative Ranking          0.373*** 0.972*** -0.413** 
          (2.72) (2.70) (-2.07) 
Local Experience 0.042* 0.006 -0.311 
      
   
 
(1.71) (1.07) (-0.53) 
      
   
Banking Experience  
  
0.529* 0.315*** 0.113    
   
   
    
(1.70) (2.94) (0.43)    
   
   
High ETC Banks  
     
-0.003 0.219** 0.105    
       
(-0.09) (2.58) (1.25)    
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 298 298 298 298 298 298 113 113 113 298 298 298 
adj. R-sq 0.5141 0.5182 0.5445 0.5101 0.5161 0.0554    0.4953 0.2516 0.5221 0.5198 0.3998 0.3980 
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